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Abstract
Models such as Sequence-to-Sequence and Image-to-
Sequence are widely used in real world applications. While
the ability of these neural architectures to produce variable-
length outputs makes them extremely effective for problems
like Machine Translation and Image Captioning, it also
leaves them vulnerable to failures of the form where the
model produces outputs of undesirable length. This be-
haviour can have severe consequences such as usage of in-
creased computation and induce faults in downstream mod-
ules that expect outputs of a certain length. Motivated by
the need to have a better understanding of the failures of
these models, this paper proposes and studies the novel
output-size modulation problem and makes two key tech-
nical contributions. First, to evaluate model robustness,
we develop an easy-to-compute differentiable proxy objec-
tive that can be used with gradient-based algorithms to find
output-lengthening inputs. Second and more importantly,
we develop a verification approach that can formally verify
whether a network always produces outputs within a cer-
tain length. Experimental results on Machine Translation
and Image Captioning show that our output-lengthening
approach can produce outputs that are 50 times longer
than the input, while our verification approach can, given
a model and input domain, prove that the output length is
below a certain size.
1. Introduction
Neural networks with variable output lengths have be-
come ubiquitous in several applications. In particular, re-
current neural networks (RNNs) such as LSTMs [17], used
♠work done during an internship at DeepMind
♣now at Facebook AI Research
to form “sequence” models [30], have been successfully and
extensively applied in in image captioning [34, 28, 21, 6,
12, 37, 26, 24, 1], video captioning [33, 38, 35, 40, 41], ma-
chine translation (MT) [30, 9], summarization [10], and in
other sequence-based transduction tasks.
The ability of these sequence neural models to generate
variable-length outputs is key to their performance on com-
plex prediction tasks. However, this ability also opens a
powerful attack for adversaries that try to force the model
to produce outputs of specific lengths that, for instance, lead
to increased computation or affect the correct operation of
down-stream modules. To address this issue, we introduce
the output-length modulation problem where given a spec-
ification of the form that the model should produce out-
puts with less than a certain maximum length, we want to
find adversarial examples, i.e. search for inputs that lead
the model to produce outputs with a larger length and thus
show that the model under consideration violates the speci-
fication. Different from existing work on targeted or untar-
geted attacks where the goal is to perturb the input such that
the output is another class or sequence in the development
dataset (thus within the dataset distribution), the output-
modulation problem requires solving a more challenging
task of finding inputs such that the output sequences are
outside of the training distribution, which was previously
claimed difficult [5].
The naive approach to the solution of the output-length
modulation problem involves a computationally intractable
search over a large discrete search space. To overcome
this, we develop an easy-to-compute differentiable proxy
objective that can be used with gradient-based algorithms
to find output-lengthening inputs. Experimental results
on Machine Translation show that our adversarial output-
lengthening approach can produce outputs that are 50 times
longer than the input. However, when evaluated on the
image-to-text image captioning model, the method is less
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successful. There could have been two potential reasons for
this result: the image-to-text architecture is truly robust, or
the adversarial approach is not powerful enough to find ad-
versarial examples for this model. To resolve this question,
we develop a verification method for checking and formally
proving whether a network is consistent with the output-
size specification for the given range of inputs. To the best
of our knowledge, our verification algorithm is the first for-
mal verification approach to check properties of recurrent
models with variable output lengths.
Our Contributions To summarize, the key contributions
of this paper are as follows:
• We propose and formulate the novel output-size mod-
ulation problem to study the behaviour of neural archi-
tectures capable of producing variable length outputs,
and we study its evaluation and verification problems.
• For evaluation, we design an efficiently computable
differentiable proxy for the expected length of the out-
put sequence. Experiments show that this proxy can
be optimized using gradient descent to efficiently find
inputs causing the model to produce long outputs.
• We demonstrate that popular machine translation mod-
els can be forced to produce long outputs that are 50
times longer than the input sequence. The long output
sequences help expose modes that the model can get
stuck in, such as undesirable loops where they con-
tinue to emit a specific token for several steps.
• We demonstrate the feasibility of formal verification
of recurrent models by proposing the use of mixed-
integer programming to formally verify that a certain
neural image-captioning model will be consistent with
the specification for the given range of inputs.
Motivations and Implications Our focus on studying the
output-length modulation problem is motivated by the fol-
lowing key considerations:
• Achieving Computational Robustness: Many ML
models are now offered as a service to customers via
the cloud. In this context, ML services employing
variable-output models could be vulnerable to denial-
of-service attacks that cause the ML model to perform
wasteful computations by feeding it inputs that induce
long outputs. This is particularly relevant for vari-
able compute models, like Seq2Seq [9, 30]. Given a
trained instance of the model, no method is known to
check for the consistency of the model with a specifica-
tion on the number of computation steps. Understand-
ing the vulnerabilities of ML models to such output-
lengthening and computation-increasing attacks is im-
portant for the safe deployment of ML services.
• Understanding and Debugging Models: By designing
inputs that cause models to produce long outputs, it
is possible to reason about the internal representations
learned by the model and isolate where the model ex-
hibits undesirable behavior. For example, we find that
an English to German sequence-to-sequence model
can produce outputs that end with a long string of ques-
tion marks (‘?’). This indicates that when the output
decoder state is conditioned on a sequence of ‘?’s, it
can end up stuck in the same state.
• Uncovering security vulnerabilities through adversar-
ial stress-testing: The adversarial approach to output-
length modulation tries to find parts of the space of
inputs where the model exhibits improper behavior.
Such inputs does not only reveal abnormal output size,
but could also uncover other abnormalities like the pri-
vacy violations of the kind that were recently revealed
by [4] where an LSTM was forced to output memo-
rized data.
• Canonical specification for testing generalization of
variable-output models: Norm-bounded perturbations
of images [31] have become the standard specifica-
tion to test attacks and defenses on image classifiers.
While the practical relevance of this particular speci-
fication can be questioned [14], it is still served as a
useful canonical model encapsulating the essential dif-
ficulty in developing robust image classifiers. We be-
lieve stability of output-lengths can serve a similar pur-
pose: as a canonical specification for variable output-
length models. The main difficulties in studying vari-
able output length models in an adversarial sense (the
non-differentiability of the objective with respect to in-
puts) are exposed in output-lengthening attack, mak-
ing it a fertile testing ground for both evaluating attack
methods and defenses. We hope that advances made
here will facilitate the study of robustness on variable
compute models and other specifications for variable-
output models such as monotonicity.
2. Related Work
There are several recent studies on generating adversarial
perturbations on variable-output models. [27, 20] show that
question answering and machine comprehension models are
sensitive to attacks based on semantics preserving modifica-
tion or the introduction of unrelated information. [11, 39]
find that character-level classifiers are highly sensitive to
small character manipulations. [29] shows that models pre-
dicting the correctness of image captions struggle against
perturbations consisting of a single word change. [5] and
[8] further study adversarial attacks for sequential-output
models (machine-translation, image captioning) with spe-
cific target captions or keywords.
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We focus on sequence output models and analyze
the output-length modulation problem, where the models
should produce outputs with at least a certain number of
output tokens. We study whether a model can be adversar-
ially perturbed to change the size of the output, which is a
more challenging task compared to targeted attacks (see de-
tails in Section 3). On the one hand, existing targeted attack
tasks aim to perturb the input such that the output is another
sequence in the validation dataset (thus within the training
distribution), but attacking output size requires the model to
generate out-of-distribution long sequences. On the other
hand, since the desired output sequence is only loosely con-
strained by the length rather than directly provided by the
user, the attack algorithm is required to explore the output
size to make the attack possible.
For models that cannot be adversarially perturbed, we
develop a verification approach to show that it isn’t simply
a lack of power by the adversary but the sign of true ro-
bustness from the model. Similar approaches have been in-
vestigated for feedforward networks [3, 7, 32] but our work
is the first to handle variable output length models and the
corresponding decoding mechanisms.
3. Modulating Output-size
We study neural network models capable of producing
outputs of variable length. We start with a canonical ab-
straction of such models, and later specialize to concrete
models used in machine translation and image captioning.
We denote by x the input to the network and by X the
space of all inputs to the network. We consider a set of in-
puts of interest S, which can denote, for example, the set of
“small”1 perturbations of a nominal input. We study models
that produce variable-length outputs sequentially. Let yt ∈
Y denote the t-th output of the model, where Y is the out-
put vocabulary of the model. At each timestep, the model
defines a probability over the next element P (yt+1|x, y0:t).
There exists a special end-of-sequence element eos ∈ Y
that signals termination of the output sequence.
In practice, different models adopt different decod-
ing strategies for generating yt+1 from the probability
P (yt+1|x, y0:t) [13, 19, 22]. In this paper, we focus on
the commonly used deterministic greedy decoding strategy
[13], where at each time step, the generated token is given
by the argmax over the logits:
y0 = argmax {P (·|x)} (1a)
yt+1 = argmax {P (·|x, y0:t)} if yt 6= eos (1b)
Since greedy decoding is deterministic, for a given sample
x with a finite length output, we can define the length of the
1The precise definition of small is specific to the application studied.
greedily decoded sequence as:
` (x)= t s.t
yt = eos
yi 6= eos ∀i < t
yi+1 = argmax {P (.|x, y0:i)} ∀i < t
(2)
Note that there is a unique t that satisfies the above condi-
tions, which is precisely the first t at which yt = eos when
using greedy decoding.
Output length modulation specification A network is
said to satisfy the output length modulation specification
parameterized by S, Kˆ, if for all inputs x in S, the model
terminates within Kˆ steps under greedy decoding for all
x ∈ S, formally:
∀x ∈ S `(x) ≤ Kˆ (3)
In Section 3.1, we study the problem of finding adversar-
ial examples, i.e., searching for inputs that lead the model
to produce outputs with a larger length and thus show that
the model violates the specification. In Section 4, we use
formal verification method to prove that a model is consis-
tent with the specification for the given range of inputs, if
such attacks are indeed impossible.
3.1. The Output-Size Modulation Problem
In order to check whether the specification, Eq. (3), is
valid, one can consider a falsification approach that tries to
find counterexamples proving that Eq. (3) is false. If an
exhaustive search over S for such counterexamples fails,
the specification is indeed true. However, exhaustive search
is computationally intractable; hence, in this section we
develop gradient based algorithms that can efficiently find
counterexamples (although they may miss them even if they
exist). To develop the falsification approach, we study the
solution to the following optimization objective:
max
x∈S
` (x) (4)
where S is the valid perturbation space. If the optimal solu-
tion x in the space S has `(x) > Kˆ, then (3) is false.
The attack spaces S we consider in this paper include
both continuous inputs (for image-to-text models) and dis-
crete inputs (for Seq2Seq models).
Continuous inputs: For continuous inputs, such as image
captioning tasks, the input is an n × m image with pixel
values normalized to be in the range [−1, 1]. x is an n×m
matrix of real numbers and X = [−1, 1]n×m. We define the
perturbation space S(x, δ) as follows:
S(x, δ) = {x′ ∈ X | ‖x′ − x‖∞ ≤ δ}
i.e., the space of δ perturbations of the input x in the `∞
ball.
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Discrete inputs: For discrete inputs, e.g., machine trans-
lation tasks, inputs are discrete tokens in a language vocab-
ulary. Formally, given the vocabulary V of the input lan-
guage, the input space X is defined as all sentences com-
posed of tokens in V , i.e., X = {(x1, . . . , xn) | xi ∈
V, n > 0}. Given an input sequence x = (x1, . . . , xn),
we define the δ-perturbation space of a sequence as all se-
quences of length n with at most dδ · ne tokens different
from x (i.e., δ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the percentage of tokens that
an attacker is allowed to modify). Formally, the perturba-
tion space S(x, δ) is defined as follows:
S(x, δ) = {(x′1, . . . , x′n) ∈ V n |
n∑
i=1
1[xi 6= x′i] ≤ dδ · ne}
3.2. Extending Projected Gradient Descent Attacks
In the projected gradient descent (PGD) attacks [25],2
given an objective function J(x), the attacker calculates the
adversarial example by searching for inputs in the attack
space to maximize J(x). In the basic attack algorithm, we
perform the following updates at each iteration:
x′ = ΠS(x,δ) (x+ α∇xJ(x)) (5)
where α > 0 is the step size and ΠS(x,δ) denotes the pro-
jection of the attack to the valid space S(x, δ). Observe that
the adversarial objective in Eq. (4) cannot be directly used
as J(x) to update x as the length of the sequence is not
a differentiable objective function. This hinders the direct
application of PGD to output-lengthening attacks. Further-
more, when the input space S is discrete, gradient descent
cannot be directly be used because it is only applicable to
continuous input spaces.
In the following, we show our extensions of the PGD
attack algorithm to handle these challenges.
Greedy approach for sequence lengthening We intro-
duce a differentiable proxy of `(x). Given an input x whose
decoder output logits are (o1, . . . , ok) (i.e., the decoded se-
quence is y = (argmax(o1), . . . , argmax(ok))), instead of
directly maximizing the output sequence length, we use a
greedy algorithm to find an output sequence whose length
is longer than k by minimizing the probability of the model
to terminate within k steps. In other words, we minimize
the log probability of the model to produce eos at any of
the timesteps between 1 to k. Formally, the proxy objective
J˜ is defined as follows:
J˜(x) =
k∑
t=1
max
{
ot[eos]− max
z 6=eos
ot[z], −
}
where  > 0 is a hyperparameter to clip the loss. This
is piecewise differentiable w.r.t. the inputs x (in the same
2Here the adversarial objective is stated as maximization, so the algo-
rithm is Projected Gradient Ascent, but we stick with the PGD terminology
since it is standard in the literature
sense that the ReLU function is differentiable) and can be
efficiently optimized using PGD.
3.3. Continuous relaxation for discrete inputs
While we can apply the PGD attack with the proxy ob-
jective on the model with continuous inputs by setting the
projection function ΠS(x,δ) as the Euclidean projection, we
cannot directly update discrete inputs. To enable a PGD-
type attack in the discrete input space, we use the Gumbel
trick [18] to reparameterize the input space to perform con-
tinuous relaxation of the inputs.
Given an input sequence x = (x1, . . . , xn), for each
xi, we construct a distribution pii ∈ R|V | initialized with
pii[xi] = 1 and pii[z] = −1 for all z ∈ V \ {xi}. The soft-
max function applied to pii is a probability distribution over
input tokens at position i with a mode at xi. With this repa-
rameterization, instead of feeding x = (x1, . . . , xn) into
the model, we feed the Gumbel softmax sampling from the
distribution (u1, . . . , un). The sample x˜ = (x˜1, . . . , x˜n) is
calculated as follows:
ui ∼ Uniform(0, 1); gi = − log(− log(ui))
p = softmax(pi); x˜i = softmax( gi+log piτ )
where τ is the Gumbel-softmax sampling temperature that
controls the discreteness of x˜. With this relaxation, we per-
form PGD attack on the distribution pi at each iteration.
Since pii is unconstrained, the projection step in (5) is un-
necessary.
When the final pi′ = (pi′1, . . . , pin) is obtained from the
PGD attack, we draw samples x′i ∼ Categorical(pii) to get
the final adversarial example for the attack.
4. Verified Bound on Output Length
While heuristics approaches can be useful in finding at-
tacks, they can fail due to the difficulty of optimizing non-
differentiable nonconvex functions. These challenges show
up particularly when the perturbation space is small or when
the target model is trained with strong bias in the training
data towards short output sequences (e.g., the Show-and-
Tell model as we will show in Section 6). Thus, we design
a formal verification approach for complete reasoning of the
output-size modulation problem, i.e., finding provable guar-
antees that no input within a certain set of interest can result
in an output sequence of length above a certain threshold.
Our approach relies on counterexample search using in-
telligent brute-force search methods, taking advantage of
powerful modern integer programming solvers [15]. We en-
code all the constraints that an adversarial example should
satisfy as linear constraints, possibly introducing additional
binary variables. Once in the right formalism, these can be
fed into an off-the-shelf Mixed Integer Programming (MIP)
solver, which provably solves the problem, albeit with a po-
tentially large computational cost. The constraints consist
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of four parts: (1) the initial restrictions on the model inputs
(encoding S(x, δ)), (2) the relations between the different
activations of the network (implementing each layer), (3)
the decoding strategy (connection between the output logits
and the inputs at the next step), and (4) the condition for it
being a counterexample (ie. a sequence of length larger than
the threshold). In the following, we show how each part of
the constraints is encoded into MIP formulas.
Our formulation is inspired by pior work on encoding
feed-forward neural networks as MIPs [3, 7, 32]. The im-
age captioning model we use consists of an image embed-
ding model, a feedforward convolutional neural network
that computes an embedding of the image, followed by a
recurrent network that generates tokens sequentially start-
ing with the initial hidden state set to the image embedding.
The image embedding model is simply a sequence of lin-
ear or convolutional layers and ReLU activation functions.
Linear and convolutional layers are trivially encoded as lin-
ear equality constraints between their inputs and outputs,
while ReLUs are represented by introducing a binary vari-
able and employing the big-M method [16]:
xi = max (xˆi, 0) ⇒ δi ∈ {0, 1}, xi ≥ 0 (6a)
xi ≤ ui · δi, xi ≥ xˆi (6b)
xi ≤ xˆi − li · (1− δi) (6c)
with li and ui being lower and upper bounds of xˆi which
can be obtained using interval arithmetic (details in [3]).
Our novel contribution is to introduce a method to extend
the techniques to handle greedy decoding used in recurrent
networks. For a model with greedy decoding, the token with
the most likely prediction is fed back as input to the next
time step. To implement this mechanism as a mixed integer
program, we employ a big-M method [36]:
omax = max
y∈Y
(oy)
⇒ omax ≥ oy, δy ∈ {0, 1} ∀y ∈ Y (7a)
omax ≤ oy + (u− ly)(1− δy) ∀y ∈ Y (7b)∑
y∈Y
δy = 1 (7c)
with ly, uy being a lower/upper bound on the value of oy
and u = maxy∈Y uy (these can again be computed us-
ing interval arithmetic). Implementing the maximum in
this way gives us both a variable representing the value of
the maximum (omax), as well as a one-hot encoding of the
argmax (δy). If the embedding for each token is given by
{embi | i ∈ Y}, we can simply encode the input to the fol-
lowing RNN timestep as
∑
y∈Y δy · emby , which is a linear
function of the variables that we previously constructed.
With this mechanism to encode the greedy decoding, we
can now unroll the recurrent model for the desired number
of timesteps. To search for an input x with output length
` (x) ≥ Kˆ, we unroll the recurrent network for Kˆ steps
and attempt to prove that at each timestep, eos is not the
maximum logit, as in (2). We setup the problem as:
max min
t=1..Kˆ
[
max
z 6=eos
ot[z]− ot[eos]
]
(8)
where o(k) represents the logits in the k-th decoding step.
We use an encoding similar to the one of Equation (7) to
represent the objective function as a linear objective with
added constraints. If the global optimal value of Eq. (8)
is positive, this is a valid counterexample: at all timesteps
t ∈ [1..Kˆ], there is at least one token greater than the eos
token, which means that the decoding should continue. On
the other hand, if the optimal value is negative, that means
that those conditions cannot be satisfied and that it is not
possible to generate a sequence of length greater than Kˆ.
The eos token would necessarily be predicted before. This
would imply that our robustness property is True.
5. Target Model Mechanism
We use image captioning and machine translation mod-
els as specific target examples to study the output length
modulation problem. We now introduce their mechanism.
Image captioning models The image captioning model
we consider is an encoder-decoder model composed of two
modules: a convolution neural network (CNN) as an en-
coder for image feature extraction and a recurrent neural
network (RNN) as a decoder for caption generation [34].
Formally, the input to the model x is an m× n sized im-
age from the space X = [−1, 1]m×n, the CNN-RNN model
computes the output sequence as follows:
i0 = CNN(x); h0 = 0
ot, ht+1 = RNNCell(it, ht)
yt = arg max(ot); it+1 = emb(yt)
where emb denotes the embedding function.
The captioning model first run the input image x through
a CNN to obtain the image embedding and feed it to the
RNN as the initial input i0 along with the initial state h0.
At each decode step, the RNN uses the input it and state ht
to compute the new state ht+1 as well as the logits ot repre-
senting the log-probability of the output token distribution
in the vocabulary. The output yt is the token in the vocabu-
lary with highest probability based on ot, and it is embedded
into the continuous space using an embedding matrixWemb
as Wemb[yt]. The embedding is fed to the next RNN cell as
the input for the next decoding step.
Machine translation models The machine translation
model is an encoder-decoder model [30, 9] with both the
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encoder and the decoder being RNNs. Given the vocab-
ulary Vin of the input language, the valid input space X
is defined as all sentences composed of tokens in Vin, i.e.,
X = {(x1, . . . , xn) | xi ∈ V, n > 0}. Given an input
sequence x = (x1, . . . , xn), the model first calculates its
embedding f(x) RNN as follows (het and i
e
t denote the en-
coder hidden states and the inputs at the t-th time step, re-
spectively. embe denotes the embedding function for each
token in the vocabulary). The model then uses f(x) as the
initial state h0 for the decoder RNN to generate the output
sequence, following the same approach as in the image cap-
tioning model.
he0 = 0; i
e
t = emb
e(xt)
het = RNNCell
e(iet , h
e
t−1); f(x) = h
e
n
6. Experiments
We consider the following three models, namely, Multi-
MNIST captioning, Show-and-Tell [34], and Neural Ma-
chine Translation (NMT) [30, 9, 2] models.
6.1. Details of models and datasets
Multi-MNIST. The first model we evaluate is a mini-
mal image captioning model for Multi-MNIST dataset. The
Multi-MNIST dataset is composed from the MNIST dataset
(Figure 1 left). Each image in the dataset is composed
from 1-3 MNIST images: each MNIST image (28 * 28)
is placed on the canvas of size (28 * 112) with random bias
on the x-axis. The composition process guarantees that ev-
ery MNIST image is fully contained in the canvas without
overlaps with other images. The label of each image is the
list of MNIST digits appearing in the canvas, ordered by
their x-axis values. The dataset contains 50,000 training
images and 10,000 test images, where the training set is
constructed from MNIST training set and the test set is con-
structed from MNIST test set. The images are normalized
to [−1, 1] before feeding to the captioning model. For this
dataset, we train a CNN-RNN model for label prediction.
The model encoder is a 4-layers CNN (2 convolution layers
and 2 fully connected layers with ReLU activation functions
applied in between). The decoder is a RNN with ReLU ac-
tivation. Both the embedding size and the hidden size are
set to 32. We train the model for 300 steps with Adam opti-
mizer based on the cross-entropy loss. The model achieves
91.2% test accuracy, and all predictions made by the model
on the training set have lengths no more than 3.
Show-and-Tell. Show and Tell model [34] is an image
captioning model with CNN-RNN encoder-decoder archi-
tecture similar to the Multi-MNIST model trained on the
MSCOCO 2014 dataset [23]. Show-and-Tell model uses
Inception-v3 as the CNN encoder and an LSTM for cap-
tion generation. We use a public version of the pretrained
model3 for evaluation. All images are normalized to [−1, 1]
3https://github.com/tensorflow/models/
and all captions in the dataset are within length 20.
NMT. The machine translation model we study is a
Seq2Seq model [30, 9] with the attention mechanism [2]
trained on the WMT15 German-English dataset. The model
uses byte pair segmentation (BPE) subword units [28] as
vocabulary. The input vocabulary size is 36, 548. The
model consists of 4-layer LSTMs of 1024 units with a bidi-
rectional encoder, with the embedding dimension set to
1024. We use a publicly available checkpoint4 with 27.6
BLEU score on the WMT15 test datasets in our evaluation.
At training time, the model restricts the maximum decoding
length to 50.
6.2. Adversarial Attacks
Our first experiment studies whether adversarial inputs
exist for the above models and how they affect model de-
coding. For each model, we randomly select 100 inputs
from the development dataset as attack targets, and com-
pare the output length distributions from random perturba-
tion and PGD attacks.
Multi-MNIST We evaluate the distribution of output
lengths of images with an `∞ perturbation radius of
δ ∈ {0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.5} using both random
search and PGD attack. In random search, we generate
10,000 random images within the given perturbation radius
for each image in the target dataset as new inputs to the
model. In PGD attack, the adversarial inputs are obtained
by running 10,000 gradient descent steps with an learning
rate of 0.0005 using the Adam Optimizer.
Neither of the attack methods can find any adversarial
inputs for δ ∈ {0.001, 0.005, 0.01} perturbation radius (i.e.,
no perturbation is found for any images in the target dataset
within the above δ to generate an output sequence longer
than the original one). Figure 2 shows the distribution of the
output lengths for images with different perturbation radius.
Results show that the PGD attack is successful at finding
attacks that push the distribution of output lengths higher,
particularly at larger values of δ. Examples of adversarial
inputs found by the model are shown in Figure 1.
Show-and-Tell For the Show-and-Tell model, we gener-
ate attacks within an `∞ perturbation radius of δ = 0.5 with
both random search and PGD attack on 500 images ran-
domly selected from the development dataset. However, ex-
cept one adversarial input found by PGD attack that would
cause the model to produce an output with size 25, no other
adversarial inputs are found that can cause the model to pro-
duce outputs longer than 20 words, which is the training
length cap. Our analysis shows that the difficulty of attack-
ing the model is resulted from its strong bias on the output
4https://github.com/tensorflow/nmt
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Figure 1. Multi-MNIST examples (left), adversarial examples found by PGD attack (mid), and their differences. For the first group, the
model correctly predicts label l1 = [6, 1] on the original image but predicts l′1 = [6, 1, 1] for its corresponding adversarial input. Predictions
on the original/adversarial inputs made by model for the second group are l2 = [0, 7, 4], l′2 = [0, 1, 4, 3], and l3 = [3], l′3 = [3, 3, 5, 3] for
the third group. The adversarial inputs in the first/second/third groups are found within the perturbation radius δ1 = 0.1, δ2 = 0.25, δ3 =
0.25.
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Figure 2. The distribution of output length for random search (de-
noted as Rand) and PGD attack with different perturbation radius
δ. The x-axis denotes the output length and y-axis denotes the
number of outputs with the corresponding length. δ = 0 (no per-
turbation allowed) refers to the original output distribution of the
target dataset.
sequence distribution and the saturation of sigmoid gates in
the LSTM decoder. This result is also consistent with the
result found by [5] that Show-and-Tell model is “only able
to generate relevant captions learned from the training dis-
tribution”.
NMT We evaluate the NMT model by comparing the out-
put length distribution from adversarial examples gener-
ated from random search and PGD attack algorithms. We
randomly draw 100 input sentences from the development
dataset. The maximum input length is 78 and their corre-
sponding translations made by the model are all within 75
tokens. We consider the perturbation δ ∈ {0.3, 0.5, 1.0}.
1. Random Search. In each run of the random attack,
given an input sequence with length n, we first ran-
domly select dδ · ne locations to modify, then ran-
domly select substitutions of the tokens at these lo-
cations from the input vocabulary, and finally run the
NMT model on the modified sequence. We run 10,000
random search steps for the 100 selected inputs, and
show the distributions of all outputs obtained from the
translation (in the total 1M output sequences).
2. PGD Attack. In PGD attack, we also start by randomly
selecting dδ · ne locations to modify for each input
sequence with length n. We then run 800 iterations
of PGD attack with Adam optimizer using an initial
learning rate of 0.005 to find substitutions of the to-
kens at these selected locations. We plot the output
length obtained from running these adversarial inputs
through the translation model.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of output sequence
lengths obtained from random search methods with dif-
ferent δ. We aggregate all sequences with length longer
than 100 into the group ‘>100’ in the plot. Results show
that even random search approach could often craft inputs
such that the corresponding output lengths are more than
75 and occasionally generates sentences with output length
over 100. The random search algorithm finds 79, 11, 3 for
δ =0.3, 0.5, 1, respectively, among the 1M translations that
are longer than 100 tokens (at small δ, the search space is
more restricted, and random search has a higher success
rate of finding long outputs). Notably, the longest sequence
found by the random search is a sequence with output length
312 tokens, where the original sequence is only 6.
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Figure 3. The histogram representing the output length distribu-
tion of the NMT model using random search with different pertur-
bations (δ ∈ {0.3, 0.5, 1}). The x-axis shows the output length.
y-axis values are divided by 10,000, the number of random pertur-
bation rounds per image.
Figure 4 shows the result from attacking the NMT model
with PGD attack. Results show that PGD attack has rel-
atively low success rate at lower perturbations compared
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Figure 4. The histogram representing the output length distribution
of the NMT model under PGD attack for different δ. x-axis shows
the output length and y-axis shows the number of instances with
the corresponding length.
(I) Die Waffe wird ausgestellt und durch den Zaun u¨bergeben.
(O) The weapon is issued and handed over by the fence . eos
(I′) Die namen name descri und ames utt origin i.e. meet grammatisch .
(O′) names name names name names grammatically name names names
names names names names names names names names names names
names names names names names names names names names names
names names names names names names names names names names
names names names names names names names names names names
names names names names names names names names names names
names names names names names names names names names names
names names names names names names names names names eos
Figure 5. An example of German to English translation where I,O
refer to an original sequence in the dataset and the corresponding
translation made by the model. I ′, O′ refer to an adversarial exam-
ple found by PGD attack and the corresponding model translation.
to larger perturbations. With an unconstrained perturbation
δ = 100%, PGD attack algorithm discovers more adversar-
ial inputs whose outputs are longer than 100 tokens (10%
among all attacks), which is 1000× more often than ran-
dom search. As an extreme case, PGD attack discovered
an adversarial input with length 3 whose output length is
575. Examples of adversarial inputs and their correspond-
ing model outputs are shown in Figure 5 and the Appendix;
we find out that a common feature of the long outputs pro-
duced by the translation model is that the output sequences
often end with long repetitions of one (or a few) words.
To analyze the bottleneck of PGD attack on the NMT
model, we further run a variation of the PGD attack where
the attack space is the (continuous) word embedding space
as opposed to the (discrete) token space: we allow the at-
tacker to directly modify token embeddings at selected at-
tack locations to any other vector. PGD attack on this vari-
ation achieves a 100% success rate to find adversarial token
embeddings such that the model outputs are longer than 500
tokens. This indicates that the discrete space is a bottleneck
for consistently finding stronger attacks.
6.3. Verification
Our implementation of the verification algorithm using
the mixed integer programming (8) is implemented using
SCIP [15]. We run our verification algorithm on the Multi-
Figure 6. Proportion of samples being provably robust (in blue),
vulnerable (in red) or of unknown robustness status (in gray) to an
attack attempting to make the model generate an output sequence
longer than the ground truth, as a function of the perturbation ra-
dius allowed to the attacker. For small radiuses, the MIP can prove
that no attacks can be successful. For large radiuses, we are able
to find successful attacks.
MNIST dataset, attempting to formally prove the robust-
ness of the model to attacks attempting to generate an out-
put longer than the ground truth. For each input image, we
set a timeout of 30 minutes for the solver.
The results in Figure 6 show that our verification algo-
rithm is able to verify formally that no attacks exists for
small perturbation radiuses. However, as the perturbation
radius increases, our verification algorithm times out and is
not able to explore the full space of valid perturbations and
thus cannot decide whether attacks exists in the given space.
For this reason, the number of robust samples we report is
only a lower bound on the actual number of robust samples.
Conversely, the vulnerable samples that we exhibit give us
an upper bound on the number of those robust samples. As
shown by the large proportion of samples of unknown sta-
tus, there is currently still a gap between the capabilities of
formal verification method and attacks.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce the existence and the con-
struction of the output-length modulation problem. We pro-
pose a differentiable proxy that can be used with PGD to
efficiently find output-lengthening inputs. We also develop
a verification approach to formally prove certain models
cannot produce outputs greater than a certain length. We
show that the proposed algorithm can produce adversarial
examples that are 50 times longer than the input for ma-
chine translation models, and the image-captioning model
can conform the output size is less than certain maximum
length using the verification approach. In future work, we
plan to study adversarial training of sequential output mod-
els using the generated attacks, to models that are robust
against output lengthening attacks, and further, verify this
formally.
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A. NMT Examples
We show a few more examples of the NMT model. We
use Ik, Ok to refer to original inputs and their translations
produced by the model, and I ′k, O
′
k for adversarial inputs /
outputs. The following adversarial examples are found by
with δ = 1 (unconstrained perturbation in the discrete token
space).
(I1) Eink-aufen vom So-fa aus
(O1) Shopping from the sofa eos
(I ′1) Schlusselwortern Anreise na¨he Hotelsafe kes hotel
(O′1) keyword 4 Com-city Hotel near Safety Deposit Box kes
hotel kes garage kes kes kes kes kes kes kes kes kes kes kes
kes kes hotel kes kes next street kes kes garage kes kes hotel
kes kes kes kes kes kes kes Hotel kes kes kes kes kes kes Hotel
kes kes kes kes kes kes kes kes kes kes kes kes kes kes kes kes
kes kes kes kes kes kes kes kes kes eos
(I2) Un-zufrie-dene
(O2) Related dis-satisfied eos
(I ′2) Anmeldung aspects ICEcat
(O′2) Regi- ment aspects ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICE-
cat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat
ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICE-
cat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat
ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICE-
cat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat
ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICE-
cat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat
ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICE-
cat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat
ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICE-
cat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat
ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICE-
cat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat
ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICE-
cat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat
ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICE-
cat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat
ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICE-
cat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat
ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICE-
cat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat
ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICE-
cat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat
ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICE-
cat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat
ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICE-
cat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat
ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICE-
cat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat
ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICE-
cat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat
ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICE-
cat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat
ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICE-
cat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat
ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICE-
cat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat
ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICE-
cat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat
ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICE-
cat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat
ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICE-
cat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat
ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICE-
cat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat
ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICE-
cat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat
ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICE-
cat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat
ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICE-
cat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat
ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICE-
cat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat
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cat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat
ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICE-
cat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat
ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICE-
cat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat
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ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat ICEcat eos
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B. A Verification Toy Example
We now provide an example of how a formal verification
problem would be encoded according to the methodology
described in Section 4. To do so, we take the illustrative
example of Figure 7 and run through the different types of
variables and constraints that needs to be defined to encode
the problem. For clarity, we will represent all solver vari-
ables with an underline.
B.1. CNN Embedding Encoding
The input domain S(x, δ) would be initially defined by a
set of bound constraints over the inputs. In the case of L∞
adversarial perturbation around an image xref, this would
take the form of defining l0 = xref − δ and u0 = xref + δ,
and creating a variable x, that will be subjected to the con-
straints:
x ≥ l0
x ≤ u0
(9)
We would then need to create some variables corresponding
to the input of the hidden layer, which would be constrained
by a linear equality depending on the network input vari-
able, and the network weights W1
aˆ = W1,ax+ b1,a bˆ = W1,bx+ b1,b (10)
The next step consists in creating variables representing the
output of the hidden layer, after the ReLU activation func-
tion. In order to do so, we need to first obtain bounds on aˆ
and bˆ. Interval analysis is one of the way to achieve this:
la = W
+
1,al0 +W
−
1,au0 + b1,a
ua = W
+
1,au0 +W
−
1,al0 + b1,a,
which bounds on bˆ being obtained similarly.
Using those bounds, we can now generate variables rep-
resenting the ReLU outputs, and constrain them to only take
the appropriate values. Using the formulation described in
Equation (6), the constraints required for the ReLU A are:
δa ∈ {0, 1}
a ≥ 0
a ≥ aˆ
a ≤ uaδa
a ≤ aˆ− la
(
1− δa
)
(11)
The outputs of the embedding network can be constructed
in a manner similar to the way we constructed the input
to the hidden layer, by enforcing a single linear equality
constraint:
i0 = W2
[
a
b
]
+ b2 (12)
We can then easily derive bounds (li0 , ui0) by using the
same interval analysis method from before.
We have now seen how to represent the allowed images,
as well as the corresponding activations throughout the em-
bedding network, as a set of variables and the linear con-
straints that they should satisfy. We will now move on to
explaining how the decoder recurrent network is encoded
into MIP constraints.
B.2. RNN Cell Encoding
The encoding of the recurrent cell is similar to the CNN
embedding described in the previous section.
Based on an initial inputs
(
ik, hk
)
, for which we have
bounds and constraints, we will create new variables repre-
senting the RNN cell activations corresponding to those in-
puts. Our example doesn’t specifically show how the RNN
cell is implemented, but provided that it is composed of
only linear operations (which will give constraints in the
style of Equations (10) and (12)) or ReLU operations (with
constraints in the style of Equations (11)), the previously
described techniques will be able to generate constrained
variables
(
ok, hk+1
)
, as well as upper and lower bound for
those variables.
B.3. Argmax Encoding
We will now show how we can create a variable that rep-
resents the argmax of the RNN cell output. In our example,
the size of the vocabulary is 2, but the technique, described
in Equation 7, is valid beyond that.
Assuming we have already created the variables ok, and
we have access to their bounds (lok , uok), we will create the
new variables ok,max and δk, subject to the constraints:
δk[0] ∈ {0, 1} δk[1] ∈ {0, 1}
ok,max ≥ ok[0] ok,max ≥ ok[1]
ok,max ≤ ok[0] + (max [uok ]− lok [0])
(
1− δk[0]
)
ok,max ≤ ok[1] + (max [uok ]− lok [1])
(
1− δk[1]
)
δk[0] + δk[1] = 1
(13)
The value ok,max can be used when we need to encode the
values of the maximum (such as in the inner term of Equa-
tion (8)), and we will be able to use the argmax variable δk
in order to implement the greedy decoding mechanism.
B.4. Vocabulary Embedding
We need to generate the variable ik+1 that corresponds
to the embedding of the token that was last predicted by
the network. We have access to the δk variable, which is by
construction a one-hot binary variable indicating which was
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xa
aˆ
b
bˆ
i0
h0 = 0
RNNCell
o0
h1
δ1 × emb
i1
RNNCell
o1
h2
. . .
δ2
(a) CNN embedding
(b) RNN Cell
(d) Vocab embedding
(c) Argmax
Figure 7. Illustration of a toy model like the one we used for the Multi-MNIST application. (a) The input image is composed of two pixels,
the image embedding network has one hidden layer with two neurons a and b, from which the inital input i0 to the network is generated.
(b) At each time step, the input to the network ik is combined (here simply concatenated) with the state hk, based on which this step’s
output ok and the next stat hk+1 are computed. (c) The maximum output of ok is identified and fed back into the network. (d) The input
of the next step of the network is the vocabulary embedding corresponding to the maximum output.
the generated token. We can simply encode:
ik+1 =
∑
y=1..2
δk[y]× emb[y] (14)
Given that only one of the δk[y] is going to be equal to 1, all
the other being 0, this will exactly correspond to choosing
the embedding corresponding to the selected token.
Note that in order to continue building the Mixed Integer
Programming problem, we need to have access to lower and
upper bounds on the values taken by ik+1. These can be
simply obtained by taking a maximum / minimum along
the token dimension of the token embeddings:
lik+1 = min
y=1..2
emb[y]
uik+1 = max
y=1..2
emb[y]
Using these bounds, as well as the derived bounds on
hk+1 that came from propagating bounds through the RNN
cell, we now have variables and bounds for the next step
of RNN enrolling. This enrolling can be repeated until the
target length to obtain a MIP encoding of the sequence gen-
erated by the network.
Inputting all these constraints into a Mixed Integer Pro-
gramming solver will then generate the desired formal ver-
ification result.
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